Quantcast
Channel: Cryptology ePrint Archive
Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 30150

Constrained PRFs for Unbounded Inputs, by Hamza Abusalah and Georg Fuchsbauer and Krzysztof Pietrzak

$
0
0
A constrained pseudorandom function $F: K \times X \to Y$ for a family of subsets of $X$ is a function where for any key $k \in K$ and set $S$ from the family one can efficiently compute a short constrained key $k_S$ which allows to evaluate $F(k,.)$ on all inputs $x\in S$, while given this key, the outputs on all inputs $x \notin S$ look random. Constrained PRFs have been constructed for several families of sets, the most general being the circuit-constrained PRF by Boneh and Waters [Asiacrypt'13]. Their construction allows for constrained keys $k_C$, where $C$ is a boolean circuit that defines the set $S = \{ x \in X | C(x) = 1 \}$. In their construction the input length and the size of the circuits $C$ for which constrained keys can be computed must be fixed a priori during key generation. In this paper we construct a constrained PRF that has an unbounded input length and constrained keys can be defined for sets recognized by Turing machines. The only a priori bound we make is on the size of the Turing machines. As applications of our constrained PRF we build a broadcast-encryption scheme where the number of potential receivers need not be fixed at setup (in particular, the length of the keys is independent of the number of parties) and the first identity-based non-interactive key-agreement protocol with no a priori bound on the number of parties that can agree on a shared key. Our CPRF is defined as $F(k,H(x))$ where $F$ is a puncturable PRF (e.g. the GGM PRF) and $H$ is a collision-resistant hash function. A constrained key for a Turing machine $M$ is a signature on $M$. At setup we also publish an obfuscated circuit, which on input $M$, a signature $\sigma$, a value $h$ and a short non-interactive argument of knowledge $\pi$ outputs $F(k,h)$ if (1) $\sigma$ is a valid signature on $M$ and (2) $\pi$ proves knowledge of some $x$ s.t. $H(x)=h$ and $M(x)=1$. For our security proof, we assume extractability obfuscation for this particular circuit.

Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 30150

Trending Articles