In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the
PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while
no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that
one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and
then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the
full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\alpha$ parameter (yet not the
one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the
structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key
recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher.
We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known
key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we
provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known
plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.
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